Noticias en español
Lifting Apportionment Methods to Weighted Fair Division.
Abstract: We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parties in a coalition government. This setting (known as weighted fair division) constitutes a generalization of the well-studied apportionment problem, and we present two approaches for lifting apportionment methods to weighted fair division. In the first part of the talk, we focus on additive valuations and show that picking sequences derived from divisor methods provide natural envy-freeness,...
Read MorePercolation games.
Abstract: Inspired by first-passage percolation models, we consider zero-sum games on Z^d and study their limit behavior when the game duration tends to infinity. After reviewing several fundamental results in this literature, we present a generalization and discuss connections with long-term behavior of Hamilton-Jacobi equations.
Read MoreDecomposition of Probability Marginals for Security Games in Abstract Networks and Ideal Clutters.
Abstract: Consider a set system on a finite ground set E, where each set P in the system is equipped with a required hitting probability r(P) and each element e of E has a probability marginal p(e). We study the question whether the marginals can be decomposed into a distribution over all subsets of E such that the resulting random set intersects each set P from the system with probability at least r(P). A simple necessary condition is that for every set P in the system, the sum of the marginals of elements in P is at least r(P). Extending a result by Dahan, Amin, and Jaillet (Mathematics of...
Read MoreCombinatorial Contracts.
Abstract: An emerging frontier in Algorithmic Game Theory is Algorithmic Contract Theory, which studies the classic hidden-action principal-agent problem of contract theory through the computational lens. In this talk, I will present three basic ways in which the problem can be combinatorial and survey both hardness and poly-time (approximation) results. The analysis will uncover some surprising connections (but also fundamental differences) to combinatorial auctions.
Read MoreExperimentation in Two-Sided Marketplaces: The Impact of Interference.
Abstract: Marketplace platforms use experiments (also known as “A/B tests”) as a method for making data-driven decisions about which changes to make on the platform. When platforms consider introducing a new feature, they often first run an experiment to test the feature on a subset of users and then use this data to decide whether to launch the feature platform-wide. However, it is well documented that estimates of the treatment effect arising from these experiments may be biased due to the presence of interference driven by the substitution effects on the demand and supply sides of the...
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